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2.

1.
Fourth

SUMMARY: The issue in

Amendment

prohibits

No. 81-1617 is whether the

police

___

from

detaining . ___....
luggage
...__

reasonably suspected of containing narcotics for the purpose of
~

arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog.
is

a

cross-petn,

in

which

the

cross-petr

No.

argues

81-1635
that

he

personally--and not merely his luggage--was seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
2.

FACTS

AND

DECISIONS

BELOW:

Cross-petr

Place

attracted the attention of narcotics detectives as he prepared
to board a plane at a Miami airport.
Place and

asked

him to

show

The detectives approached

identification.

He did so.

The

detectives did not detain him and Place boarded the plane for
New York.
listed

After

false

detectives

their

investigation revealed that Place had

addresses

phoned

on

agents

in

approached Place in New York.

his
New

luggage
York.

tags,
Those

the
agents

Miami
then

They did so based on both their

own observations of his behavior and the information telephoned
from

Miami.

After

a

short

discussion,

the

detectives

told

Place that he was free to leave but that his luggage was being
r--------~-----detained for exposure to a narcotics detection dog.
At this
point Place apparently made a
declined.
hours

Place left a phone number and departed.

later

signalled

bribe offier, which the police

the

a

dog

sniffed

presence

of

Place's

drugs

in

luggage.
one

Its

sui tease.

-

About two
response
With

this

information police phoned a magistrate, who issued a warrant

3.

authorizing a search.

The luggage was

cocaine, and marijuana.
Contending

that

found

to contain LSD,

Place then was arrested.

he

and

his

luggage

had

been

seized

in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, Place moved for suppression
of the evidence.
court

found

The dist ct

that

at

(Platt) denied the motion.

"reasonable

suspicion"

encounters both in Miami and in New York.
dist

ct

suggeted

Place and his
only

briefly

Terry v.

that

luggage
for

Ohio,

the

392

there

was

kind

u.s.

1

of

that "reasonable suspicion"

leave.

The

Fourth

the

to detain

Place had been detained
countenanced

Further,

by

the court found

justified detention of the luggage

for sniffing by the narcotics detection dog.
to

cause"

investigation

(1968).

supported

(In a footnote the

"probable

in New York.)

The

Amendment

did

not

Place was allowed
apply

equally

to

persons and to inanimate objects.
A
raised

divided~A2
in

the

reversed.

issue

CA2 did not consider the

cross-petition--whether

Place

personally

was

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment or whether he was
only detained

in a permissible Terry stop.

Focussing on the

seizure of Place's luggage, Judge Mansfield's majority opinion

\

fo~nd

I

that there was no distinction between the standard for

se1zure of persons and of possessions.

of

"reasonable

suspicion"

that Place was carrying narcotics,

_________..____

there still was not probable cause.
detention
justified.

of

Place's
In

so

luggage

holding

Assuming the existence

CA2

for

And without probable cause
two

hours

distinguished

could
cases

not
in

be

which

4.

other CAs have upheld detention of luggage for dog-sniffing on
the

basis

Viegas,

of

"reasonable

639 F.2d 42

4, 1981);

suspicion."

United States v. West,

Florida v.

Roye 9 ;

651 F.2d 71

these

States

80-1344

v.
(May

(CAl 1981), pet

(currently being held for No. 80-

United States v.

(CA7 1980); and United States v.
1981).

United

(CAl 1981), cert denied, No.

for cert pending, No. 81-307
2146,

See

Klein,

Martell,

626 F.2d 22

654 F.2d 1356

(CA9

According to Judge Mansfield, the detention in each of
cases

had

been

much

involved in this case.

more

limited

than

the

two

hours

Judge Mansfield also distinguished the

case principally relied on by the other CAs, United States v.
Van Leeuwen,
upheld

a

one-day

suspicion of
that

u.s.

397

period

249

(1970).

detention

postal
then was

of

officials;
used

In Van Leeuwen this Court
two

packages

arousing

the

information discovered during

to obtain

a

search warrant.

The

central difference, according to Judge Mansfield, was that the
owner of the parcels in Van Leeuwen had deposited the parcels
with

the

post

office,

"thereby

voluntarily

relinquishing

custody and control over then for an indefinite period."
20a.

And

the

Court

in

Van

Leeuwen

holding to the facts of the case.
Judge Oakes concurred
wrote

separately

to

397

carefully

u.s.,

App.

limited

at 252-253.

in Judge Mansfield's opinion.

emphasize

his

view

its

that

the

He

Fourth

Amendment should be read "not atomistically, but regulatorily."
He would approve "sidestepping" the probable casue requirement
for

searches and seizures,

if at all, only when the stop or

I

I

5.

search was

conducted

pursuant to clear

rules adopted by

the

appropriate government authority.
Judge Kaufman dissented.
as

permissible

luggage,

the

seizures.

under

He regarded the stops of Place

Terry.

Fourth

As

Amendment

to

the

prohibits

detention
only

of

the

unreasonable

And here the reasonable suspicion of the detaining

officers, viewed in a balance with the government interest in
stopping drug traffic and the

less than two hour duration of

the

detention

detention,

legitimate

rendered

privacy

subsequent

interest

issuance

searched.

the

of

was

a

reasonable.

protected

warrant

before

adequately
the

Place's
by

luggage

the
was

Van Leeuwen was the governing authority.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petitioning in No. 81-1617, the SG

argues that CA2's decision conflicts with decisions of CAs 1,
7,

and 9,

have

supra,

reasoned--in

and with Van Leeuwen,
clear

contrast

with

supra.

These courts

CA2--that

"Terry

and

Dunaway and their progeny relate to the detention of people,
not inanimate objects."

Viegas, supra, 654 F.2d, at 1359.

Nor

can the cases be distinguished on the basis of the duration of
the detention in the different cases.
unclear

as

to the

length of

the

The record in Klein is

detention~

the detention

in

West was for about an hour, compared with less than two hours
here.

And though the publised opinion in Viegas is silent, the

Brief in Opposition to cert in that case, No.

80-1344, at 3,

indicates that the agents there were informed that no dog would
be available for four hours.

6.

Respondent
majority.

The

conflict.

summarily
cases

And

establish

the

different

repeats

are

the

reasoning

fact-specific;

Fourth

Amendment

standards

of

of

hence

the

there

generally

is

no

does

not

for

the

reasonableness

detention of persons and of objects.

CA2

Van Leeuwen was limited

to its facts by this Court's own opinion.
In the cross-petn, No.

81-1835, Place argues that Fourth

Amendment rights are violated whenver a person is stopped for
questioning

solely

on

basis

the

certain

of

"profile

characteristics."
The SG responds that this issue is not properly presented.
Any question here is inherently fact-bound, as the enforcement
officials relied on factors beyond "profile" characteristics.
Moreover,

this

If CA2 Is

question was not addressed by CA2.

judgment is reversed, the CA should have the first opportunity
to consider this question.

Additionally, as argued in the SG's

amicus brief in No. 80-2146, Florida v. Royer, every "stop" is
not

a

dist

"seizure."
ct

cited

And even if a seizure did occur here,
a

number

of

specific

facts

the

establishing

a

"reasonable suspicion" that would justify a brief investigative
stop.
DISCUSSION:
clear

split

detention of

among
a

I

agree

with

the

CAs

on

sui tease

for

dog

the

the

SG

that

standard

sniff.

This

there

is

required
issue

also

a

for
is

presented in No. 81-307, West v. United States, which is being
held for No. 80-2146, Florida v. Royer.

l

I

f

7.

I
and

think it is clear that the Court could Grant this case

decide

the

important

suspicion"

will

pending

dog-sniff. ___Because

a

suffice

issue
to

argued:

justify
of

a

Whether

"reasonable

detention

the

of

importance

luggage
of

this

question, I recommend a Grant.
It appears, however, that the same issue could have been
reached in West, supra, which the Court instead held for Royer.
I

think

it most unlikely

that Royer

But it is not impossible.

could

affect this case.

Because of the Court's disposition

of West, it may be worthwhile here to discuss the relationship
of this case to Royer.
Royer--like

this

Court's

States v. Mendenahll, 446

u.s.

previous

decision

in

544 (1980)--principally involves

the validity of a defendant's consent to a search.
at least two potential issues.

United

There are

First, was there a "seizure" of

the person of the kind that might constitute an illegal arrest
if

not

justified

standard?
invalid.

If

under

so,

appropriate

Fourther

Amendment

the subsequent consent to search might be

Second,

applicable

the

however,

Fourth

cause--was satisfied?

comes

Amendment

the

question

whether

standard--presumably

the

probable

Royer could affect this case only if the

Court reached the second issue and decided that certain "drug
courier

profile"

probable cause.

characteristics were

strongly

indicative of

Although CA2 found no probable cause

in the

current petn, the dist court, in a footnote, App. 57a, appears
to have held that there was probable cause for the detention in

8.

New York.

The Government has not argued either

this Court that probable cause existed.

in CA2 or in

But, should Royer be

decided in this way, I suppose the case could be GVR 1 ed for CA2
to reconsider the probable cause question.

As stated earlier,

I regard this possibility as probably too remote to call for a
hold.

But

the

likelihood

of

West 1 s

being

affected

may

be

81-1835,

is

equally remote.
Overall, I would recommend a Grant in No. 81-1617.
The

issue

raised

whether

"profile

even

Terry-type

a

by the cross-petition,

characteristics"
stop

under

are

the

No.

sufficient

Fourth

to

warrant

Amendment.

This

question would arise in this case only if the Court granted the
main petition;

otherwise

there would be an

independent basis

for suppressing the evidence under the CA2 holding.

Whatever

the Court does with the main petition, for the reasons cited by
the

SG

there

question

in

is

no

the

decided whether

reason

current
Place 1 s

for

posture

the

Court

of

the

to

case.

consider
CA2

this

has

not

rights were violated in this regard.

If this Court reversed on the issue in the main petition, Place
could

still

raise

Accordingly,

I

cross-petn.

There

question

could

Florida v.

think

be

Royer.

this

defense

that

the

in

Court

simply

is also a possibility,
affected
If

by

the

the

lower
could

however,

decision

in No.

courts.
deny

the

that this
80-2146,

the Court grants the main petition,

it

therefore might wish to consider holding the cross-petn either
for Royer or for the main petn itself.

I

'

9.

There are responses to both the petn and the cross-petn.
c:-

May 17, 1982

----

Fallon

opn in petns

Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ............... . , 19 .. .

Announced .............. .. , 19 .. .

No.

81-1835

PLACE
vs.

UNITED STATES

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DIS

AFF

Burger, Ch. J ................ .
Brennan, J ................... .
White, J ..................... .
Marshall, J .................. .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Powell, J .................... .

'"[7 ................ .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Stevens, J ........................... .
O'Connor, J .......................... .

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ............... . , 19 .. .

Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

No.

81-1617

UNITED STATES
vs.

PLACE

HOLD
FOR

Burger, Ch. J ................ .

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

CERT.
G

D

N

'/

POST

DI S

AFF

; ; ·················

White, J ..... . ....... .. .... . . .

v.
.........
·······
Y

Marshall, J .................. .
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

REV

AFF

'''''''''''''''''''''

Brennan, J ................... .

•

MERITS

•

0

••••••••

0

••••••••

Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /. . . . . . ....... ·r,_J · .IJ(J ... .

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /
Stevens,

.

.'.lr. ... lrt~:Q-, ... .

J............................ . . . . . . . . . . . .

O'Connor, J ....................

V..... ............

. ...... .

....... .

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VO'riNG

Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted .. .............. , 19 .. .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

81-1617

UNITED STATES
vs.

PLACE

CERT.

HOLD
FOR

G

D

JURISDI CTIONAL
STATEME NT
N

POST

DI S

AFF

M ERITS
RE V

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V V ......... ........... .

!::~:~~ ~·:::::::::::::::::::

I; ::::::::::::::::.

Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v· . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · ·

V ... .......... ...... .

Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / . 1.1 . • • • ••••••••••••••••

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~

. . . . ......... . ..... .

...'./... ........... .
1

Stevens, J .................... .

O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . . .

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

Michael F. Sturley

1.

May the police seize personal luggage and hol

for a reasonable period pending

exposu~a

narcotics detection·

dog when they have reasonable suspicion (but not probable cause)
to believe that the luggage contains narcotics?
2.

What constitutes a "reasonable

of such a seizure?

period'.!.~ r

purposes

~~~
~~
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III.
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Conclusion
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13
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I.
A.

Background

Facts
On Friday, August 17, 1979, resp attracted police atten-

tion at Miami International Airport.

Soon after he entered the

airport, officers noticed that he was scanning the terminal area
and seemed to be very nervous.

After standing

in line at the

National Airlines ticket counter for 20 minutes, he purchased a
ticket on the 12:40 flight to LaGuardia Airport in New York with
cash,

and checked his two sui teases.

sui teases

bore resp' s

true name and

Ocean Drive in Hallandale, Florida.

The luggage
a

tags on the

street address on South

The street numbers, however,

differed slightly: 1885 on one bag and 1865 on the other.
After
point,

resp passed through

the airline security check-

two officers approached him and asked to see his ticket

'-.._/

and some identification.

Resp produced his ticket and a New Jer-

sey driver's license, both of which properly identified him.
officers asked permission to search his suitcases,
sented.
time,

Since

it

was

then

12:35,

five

minutes

they decided not to conduct the search.

The

and he con-

before

flight

As they parted,

resp stated that he had recognized them as policemen when he had
first seen them in the lobby.
This parting taunt apparently angered the officers, for
they immediately resumed their investigation.
callback

number

on

resp' s

reservation

from

They obtained the
National Airlines.

This number was assigned to 1980 South Ocean Drive in Hallandale.
The Hallandale police reported (incorrectly, it was later discovered) that neither 1885 nor 1865 South Ocean Drive (the addresses

on the luggage tags) existed.

The Miami officers telephoned DEA

agents in New York and passed on the information they had discovered.
When

resp' s

plane

arrived at LaGuardia,

some

two and

one-half hours later, two DEA agents were waiting for him.

After

observing his nervous behavior and allowing him to reclaim his
suitcases, the agents approached resp and identified themselves.
They asked permission
claiming

that

it

-------------'

to search his

luggage,

----

already had been searched

but he declined,

in Miami.

At this

I

point the agents seized the suitcases and told

resp that they

would be held until a federal judge had determined whether there
(One agent also

was probable cause to issue a search warrant.
took

resp' s

violations.)

driver's 1 icense and

ran a computer check for

any

Resp was told that he was free to go, but that he
~

Resp

The agents did not tell him how

long they planned to hold the luggage, but one of them gave resp
a piece of paper listing his name and telephone numbers where he
could "be reached by your attorney or yourself to pick up this
luggage."

J.A. 9.
By then it was about 4:00 o'clock Friday afternoon.

agents
about
court,

took
4:10.

the

sui teases

Rather

to

their

than taking

car

and

The

left LaGuardia at

the suitcases to the district

as they had told resp they would,

they drove to Kennedy

Airport, where they arrived some 35 minutes later.

At about 5:30

or 5:40, a trained "sniffer dog" reacted positively to the small_..----.
er bag, indicating that there was a controlled substance inside .

.

The agents therefore contacted the
for

u.s.

Attorney's Office (EDNY)

instructions and were told to apply for a warrant on Monday

morning.

---

They

secured

the sui teases

in

their office over

the

weekend.
On Monday afternoon a federal magistrate (Caden)

a warrant for the smaller bag.
ered over

u.s.c.

a

kilogram of

§84l(a) (1)

issued

On opening it, the agents discov-

cocaine.

Resp was

indicted

under

21

(possessing cocaine with intent to distribute

it) .

B.

Decisions Below
Resp's motion to suppress the cocaine discovered in the

sui tease was denied by the DC

(EDNY; Platt) .

The DC concluded

J c:_

that resp's behavior created a reasonable suspicion that he was
carrying narcotics,

and this reasonable suspicion justified the

stop that occurred at LaGuardia when the DEA agents took resp's
license and suitcases.
626 F.2d 22
gage, too.

On the basis of United States v. Klein,

(CA7 1980), the DC upheld the detention of the lugEven if reasonable suspicion is inadequate to justify

a seizure, the DC noted (without explanation) that the agents had
probable cause to detain the bags here.
On appeal,

CA2

(Mansfield

Kaufman [dissent]) reversed.

[majority],

Oakes

[concur];

Judge Mansfield, writing the major-

ity opinion, found it "clear that the drug enforcement agents did
not have probable cause to arrest Place or seize his baggage at
LaGuardia Airport," petn app lla, but was willing to assume that
they had reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop,

(/I L

Judge Mansfield was also willing to assume that the
1 (1968), apply to seizures

--------

of property,

despite arguments that the Terry exception to the

Fourth Amendment's probable cause
expanded.

Petn app 15a.

requirement should not be so

Even with these assumptions, however,

--

the police were only entitled to detain the suitcases for a rea----------~

sonable

period.

-

Judge

Mansfield

concluded

that

the

detention

here went well beyond the narrow exception sanctioned by Terry.
He relied on the excessive length of time that the luggage was
held, "the high-handed procedure adopted by the agents," the fact
that the agents lied to resp about what the agents would do with
the suitcases, and the fact that such extreme measures were unjustified by the circumstances of the case.
Judge
Leeuwen,

Mansfield

397 U.S. 249

voluntarily

distinguished

(1970),

relinquished

for

forwarding

and

States

and

control

over

Van

the parcels

(at least a couple of days)

delivery."

v.

in which the owner of two parcels

custody

"for the indefinite period

United

Petn app

20a.

required

Judge Mansfield

also distinguished decisions in other CAs where the detention of
a suspect's luggage had been reasonable--in sharp contrast to the
present case.

Id., at 2la.

Judge Oakes concurred in Judge Mansfield's opinion, thus
giving Judge Mansfield majority support, but wrote separately to
emphasize his own Fourth Amendment views.
Fourth

Amendment

regulatorily."

should

Id., at 22a.

be

read

not

He argued "that the
atomistically,

but

Warrantless seizures on less than

probable cause should be permissible only when conducted "pursu-

ant

to duly adopted,

proper,

nondi scr imina tory,

and reasonable

rules or regulations adopted by the appropriate governmental authority and subjected to appropriate judicial review."
Judge

Kaufman dissented.

the luggage was reasonable.

In his view,

Ibid.

the seizure of

He seems to argue that the seizure

was justified by the later discovery of the cocaine, id., at 25a,
by the exigent circumstances, ibid., by the fact that resp could
have

avoided

any

Amendment rights,

inconvenience

merely

by

waiving

his

Fourth

id., at 26a, and by the fact that the seizure

of the suitcases did not violate resp's privacy interest in their
contents,

id., at 26a-27a.

He found Judge Mansfield's distinc-

tions between Van Leeuwen and the present case to be "nebulous"
and unpersuasive.

Id., at 27a.

II.
I

Discussion

fear that the Court has again taken a case to decide

an important issue which is not well presented by the case.
the

SG

claims

that

the

question

presented

is

"[w] hether

Here
the

Fourth Amendment prohibits police from temporarily detaining personal

luggage

reasonably suspected of containing narcotics

for

the purpose of arranging its exposure to a trained narcotics deteet ion dog."

Brief

for

the United States

i.

That question,

however, was neither addressed nor decided by CA2.

Judge Mans-

field assumed that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a reasonable detention of luggage reasonably suspected of containing
narcotics

for

the purpose of exposing it to a sniffer dog.

It

was only after making this assumption that he found the detention

here to be unreasonable.

It thus appears that this case will end

up being much like Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146: the Court will
give important guidance to police on what they are allowed to do
in airports, but technically the guidance will be dicta.

A.

The Permissible Police Options
The first inquiry should focus on the options that are

legitimately available to police who desire to discover the contents of a closed container in which a suspect has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.

What steps may police take, and what do

they need to support their actions?

(1) Probable Cause.

I begin with the easy case.

If the

police have both (i) probable cause to believe that there is

-

con-~

traband or other evidence of a crime inside a closed container,~
......._,
and

(ii)

a valid warrant describing that container,

should be no problem with the Fourth Amendment.

then there

The police may

seize the container and conduct the search immediately.
If the police have probable cause, but no
may not search the container immediately.
442

u.s.

(1977).

753

(1979) ~

United

States

warra~

they

Arkansas v. Sanders,

v.vChadwick,

433

u.s.

1

If the exigencies of the circumstances demand it, howev-

er, they are entitled to seize the container and secure it pending a decision on their request for a warrant.
example,

the

police

"had

In Sanders, for

ample probable cause to believe that

respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana."
761.

442 U.S., at

But it was being taken away from the airport in a taxi, so

if the police did not seize it immediately they were likely to
lose it entirely.
case without

a

Although they had no right to search the suit-

warrant,

you declared that

" [ t] he pol ice acted

properly--indeed commendably--in apprehending
gage," ibid.

[resp' s]

lug-

Dicta in Chadwick similarly endorsed the seizure of

a footlocker there.

433

u.s.,

at 13, 15-16.

Again the seizure

was based on probable cause, and justified by the fact that the
suspects were about to drive away with the evidence.

(2)

Reasonable

Suspicion.

The

general

rule

is

that

searches and seizures subject to the Fourth Amendment require a
warrant supported by probable cause.
and carefully drawn'

There are "a few 'jealously

exceptions" to this general rule, Arkansas

u.s.,

at 759 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357

U.S. 493, 499 (1958))

(footnote omitted), such as the one recog-

v. Sanders, 442

nized

in Terry v.

~ant

Ohio,

principles in

392 U.S.

1

(1968).

You explained the

San~~

[B] ecause each exception to the warrant requirement
invariably impinges to some extent on the protective
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in
which a search may be conducted in the absence of a
warrant have been carefully delineated and "the burden
is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for
it."
United States v. Jeffers, 342 u.s. 48, 51
(1951) •... Moreover, we have limited the reach of each
exemption to that which is necessary to accommodate the
identified needs of society.
442 U.S., at 759-760.

Most of the "few 'jealously and carefully

drawn' exceptions" permit the police to dispense with a warrant,
but still require the existence of probable cause.

For present

purposes, the most relevant exception is that recognized by Terry

-

and its progeny, which allow a warrantless seizure of a person on
less than probable cause.

This Court has never recognized a war-

rantless seizure of property on less than probable cause. 1

The

issue, therefore, is whether the Court should create a new exception along Terry lines to permit property seizures.
There are good arguments why there should not be a property

seizure

exception.

than probable

Historically,

cause were one of

Fourth Amendment, 2

and

the

seizures
principal

based

targets of

it could be considered contrary

Amendment's purposes to create a seizure exception.
been argued

that property seizures cannot be

on

less
the

to the

It has also

justified by the

Terry rationale, for there are no differences in degree: "an owner is either dispossed of his property or it remains in his custody."

Comment, Seizing Luggage on Less than Probable Cause, 18

Am. Crim. L. Rev. 637, 645 (1981).
On balance, I am unconvinced by these arguments.
elude

(

that

there

should

be

a

narrow

exception

to

the

I conFourth

1

The closest case is United States v
249 (1970). There two suspicious package
post office.
Rather than forwarding the
· tely to their
destinations, the post office delayed their delivery pending a
decision on a search warrant. Since the suspect had voluntarily
surrendered the packages to the post office, there was no seizure
involved.
The Court recognized that, in theory, "detent1on of
mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure •.. within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," id., at 252, but held
that no Fourth Amendment interest had been invaded "on the facts
of this case," id., at 253.
Since the case was decided, This
Court has never cited Van Leeuwen for its holding.
2The historical considerations are discussed in the ACLU' s
Amicus Brief at pp. 16-26.
(In view of the weakness of resp's
brief, this is a brief you should read in any event.)

Amendment's probable cause requirement to govern minimally intrusive property seizures.

Although I agree with the Government's

conclusion on this point, I find it a much harder question than
the SG would make it.
from Terry,

despite

justification for

The conclusion does not follow directly

the SG's assertions

detaining a

to the contrary.

person for

The

an investigative stop

does not necessarily entitle an officer to seize the suspect's
luggage for

the same period.

If the officer has no reasonable

suspicion relevant to the luggage itself,
. - -__ the suspect should be
free to turn it over to a third party when that is a practical
option.

And given that the detention of a suspect does not nee-

essarily entitle an officer to detain the suspect's luggage,

it

does not always follow that detaining the luggage is the lesser
intrusion.

Nor is it always true that a seizure of a container

is less intrusive than an impermissible search of that container.
See Chambers v.

Maroney,

399 U.S.

42, 51-52

the search or seizure of an automobile,
and which the

'lesser'

(1970)

(As between

"which is the 'greater'

intrusion is itself a debatable question

and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances.").
nally,

there are distinctions

between people and property that

make a limited seizure of property less appropriate.
Mansfield recognized, .

a

sui tease
.........._

Fi-

._,-'\

(unlike a per son)

As Judge

cannot inde-

pendently resume its course after the police have finished with
it.

Petn app 15a. ~-----------------------------~

-----

Nevertheless,

the Terry

rationale

is compelling

here.

~

Contrary to the argument made in the secondary literature, there
are differences in degree among property seizures.

The seizure

may be brief or prolonged.

The officer may hold the property in

the suspect's presence, or remove it to a distant location.
seizure may come under circumstances to cause minimal

The

inconve-

nience, or at a time that wrecks havoc with the suspect's plans.
The item seized may be of minor importance, or essential to the
suspect's life.

All of these factors can be considered in decid-

ing whether a given seizure is so minimally intrusive that it may
be justified by reasonable suspicion and the government's interest in stemming the drug traffic.

B.

The Existence of Reasonable Suspicion

__________________ ______________

'--I conclude that the DEA agents at LaGuardia
had reason-

able

suspicion sufficient to

justify a Terry stop by the time

~

they

seized

resp's

suitcases,

but once

again

the

closer than the SG would have the Court believe.
Royer,

No.

question

is

In Florida v.

80-2146, we agreed that the officers had reasonable

suspicion when they learned that Royer was travelling under an
alias.

Here I

do not think that the DEA a ents had comparable

-

suspicion until resp lied to them about his suitcases having been

____,

'

......._

searched in Miami.
Before resp's lies, there was little real evidence suggesting criminal activity except for resp's nervous behavior and
scanning of the airport terminal, and that alone cannot be enough
to establish reasonable suspicion.

The discrepancy between the

addresses on the baggage tags was minor, and it could easily be
explained by the fact

that resp was not from Hallendale.

driver's license was issued by New Jersey.)

(His

The discrepancy be-

came

particularly

insignificant when the officers learned that

resp had tagged his luggage with his true name.

His paying for

his flight in cash might have been suspicious (although there is
no indication that the flight was very expensive, or that resp
had a large roll of small bills) , but the cash payment lost whatever significance it had when the officers discovered that resp
(i)

had given a genuine callback number when making his reserva-

tion and (ii) had purchased his ticket under his true name. 3
Other

suspicious

circumstances commonly

courier profile cases were not present here.
elling

without

States v.

luggage

Mendenhall,

(a

446

factor

u.s.,

deemed

found

in drug

Resp was not trav-

suspicious

in

United

at 547 n.l), or with unusually

heavy suitcases

(a factor deemed suspicious

empty suitcases

(a factor deemed suspicious in some lower court

cases) •

He was not a

known drug dealer.

in Royer),

In fact,

or with

a computer

check of his license revealed no violations at all.
Despite all
York

DEA agents

this,

about his

I

think

the 1 ies

experience with

resp

told the New

the Miami pol icemen

were enough to give them sufficient reasonable suspicion for
Terry stop.

a

Coupled with his nervous behavior and scanning of

the airport, they made it reasonably likely that he was trying to
hide

something.

The

lies

also

focused

this

suspicion on

the

3 The only reason it is suspicious for a person to misidentify
his luggage or to pay for a plane ticket with cash is because
these actions indicate a desire to avoid having his ownership of
the luggage or his identity discovered. When resp used his true
name for both the luggage tags and the flight reservation, however, such a suspicion is no longer justified.

.fl

¥

suitcases.

Under all of the circumstances, the agents were well

short of probable cause, but they had a reasonable suspicion that
resp was carrying contraband in his suitcases.

C.

The Reasonableness of the Seizure
Although an exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable

cause requirement is justified, it is justified only if the seizure is minimally intrusive.
dealing with an

exce~tion

........-.

~

The Court must remember that it is

to a constitutional provision, and the

exception should be narrowly drawn.

(1)

The SG' s

General Arguments.

The SG makes certain

general arguments that would lead to an expansive exception for
property seizures.

For example, he contends that a property sei-

zure "may be of longer duration than a detention of the person
because it entails a significantly lesser intrusion into personal
liberty."

Brief for

-----

the United States 11; see also id., at 23

/
(" [T] he detention of baggage is significantly less intrus
i"t7e-alan

the detention of a person.").

Although this generalization may

be true for extended seizures, that is irrelevant here.

It does

not matter that a two-week property seizure is significantly less
intrusive than a two-week arrest, or even that a two-hour property seizure is significantly less intrusive than a
rest,

~

for

it is clear that a person may not be seized for that

long without probable cause.
(1979).

two-hour ar-

Dunaway v. New York, 442

u.s.

200

It does the Government no good for the SG to argue that

the seizure at

issue

is not so bad as something else

that

is

.

'

..

clearly impermissible.4
The

relevant comparison is between a

property seizure

and the most intrusive seizure of a person that is permissible.
The permissibility of a Terry stop, of course, varies according
to the circumstances,
brief detentions.
(detention
warrant);

of

but thus

far

the Court has endorsed only

See Michigan v. Summers,

home-owner

United States v.

while

home

Cortez,

449

452

u.s.

searched
U.S.

411

692

pursuant
(1981)

immigration check near bofder); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
106

(1977)

weapons
( 197 5)

(order

frisk);

to

leave car

United States v.

when car

(1981)
to

(brief

434 U.S.

lawfully stopped and

-

Brignoni-Ponce,

422

U.S.

873

(investigative stop near border lasting less than a minute

for "a brief question or two"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972)
supra

(weapons frisk on basis of reasonable suspicion); Terry,
(same).

The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-

Procedure would

limit Terry stops

to a maximum of

Although twenty minutes is longer than any stop

4 If it was not already clear from Dunaway, it is certainly
clear from Royer that the DEA agents could not have seized resp
himself on the basis of reasonable suspicion and taken him from
LaGuardia to Kennedy in order to carry out further investigation.
5 The ALI proposal provides:
A law enforcement officer, lawfully present in any
place, may [under certain circumstances] order a person
to remain in the officer's presence near such place for
such period as is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes authorized [by the proposal],
but in no case for more than twenty minutes.
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §110. 2 (1)

l

(1975).

that the Court has permitted,

and the choice of twenty minutes

has been criticized in the secondary literature for being excessive,6 it can probably be viewed as a good approximation of the

~

theoretical maximum.

At this level, the SG's assertion is proba-

bly incorrect, for a twenty-minute property seizure is likely to
be just as intrusive as a twenty-minute detention.

In most cases

a suspect will stay with the luggage for the twenty minutes to
assure himself that nothing happens to it.

In that case, there

is no practical difference between the seizure of the luggage and
the detention of the person.
stay with the luggage,

But even if the suspect does not

he is effectively tied to the immediate

vicinity so that he can reclaim it.
arrangements

to

recover

a

sui tease

The need to make special
is

probably more

intrusive

than simply staying with it for twenty minutes, at least in most
cases.
In sum,

the comparison with Terry does not support an

expansive exception.

When a

property seizure goes beyond what

Terry would permit for a seizure of a person,

7

it is no longer a

minimal intrusion that may be justified on grounds of reasonable
suspicion.
The SG also argues

that United States v.

Van Leeuwen

demonstrates that an extended property seizure is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

This argument, however, ignores

6 E.g., Note, Field Interrogations: Court Rule and Pol ice Response, 49 J. Urb. L. 767, 776 (1972) (most field interrogations
take less than ten minutes) •

.

'

the

fact

that

context. 7

The

Van

Leeuwen

"detention"

seizure from a suspect,

for

arose

in

an

entirely

in Van Leeuwen did not

different

involve any

the suspect had voluntarily surren-

dered custody of the packages to postal authorities.

The suspect

was not even aware of the detention until well after it was over.
Had the warrant not been issued, it is not clear that the suspect
would even have

known

that

the detention had

taken place,

for

mail often arrives a day or two later than a person might expect
it.

Judge Chambers,

in CA9's Van Leeuwen decision, gave an apt

summary of the situation:
I think I am as sensitive as anyone to the Fourth
Amendment in protecting one's person and one's home.
But the detention of Van Leeuwen's "hot money" at the
post office for 29 hours does not offend me very much.
Someone in the post office holds up much of my mail
over 29 hours.
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 414 F.2d 758, 760 (CA9 1969)
bers,

J.,

concurring),

rev'd

on

other

grounds,

397

(Cham-

u.s.

249

(1970).
There are other distinctions that make Van Leeuwen less
compelling than the SG contends.
the detention of

In Van Leeuwen,

the packages was unrelated

to

for example,

the finding of

7 of course Van Leeuwen would be relevant in a similar context.
For example, the Court might wish to indicate that DEA
agents have considerably more leeway with respect to checked luggage during the period after the passenger has surrendered it to
the airline and before he has reclaimed it at the baggage claim
area. So long as the luggage arrives at the claim area at about
the same time it would have arrived without police interference,
Van Leeuwen is relevant authority supporting a detention.

J

I

probable cause.

The police did not establish probable cause by

investigating the packages, but by investigating the addressees.
In

its brief,

the Government relied on the fact

that it could

have conducted the investigation in the same way without detaining the packages.
This means that,

Brief for the United States in Van Leeuwen 6.
under Wong Sun v. United States, 371

u.s.

471

(1963), any problem with the detention would not have tainted the
warrant.

Accordingly,

initial detention,

Van Leeuwen

did

not

even challenge

the

but rather challenged the lapse of time be-

tween the establishment of probable cause and the application for
a search warrant.

Brief for Resp in Van Leeuwen 19 ("this unrea-

sonable lapse of time after having probable cause violated the
Fourth Amendment").

(2)

The Facts Here.

On the facts of the case here,

I

have no difficulty in concluding that the DEA agents went well
beyond the minimal intrusion that could be justified on the basis
of reasonable suspicion.

The outrageousness of their behavior is

highlighted by the fact that even Judge Mansfield 8 condemned it.
Resp's suitcases were seized from him at about 4:00 on a
Friday afternoon.

9tJ~

It was an hour and a half late r

before the

agents were able to expose the bags to a "sniffer dog" at a different location.

If the dog had not detected drugs in the bags,

8 Judge Mansfield is not only a good judge, on criminal rna tters he is easily the m~rvative of the g~d jugges on the
Second Circuit.

~ it

would have been at least two hours before resp could have re-

covered his luggage--and this requires several generous assumptions.

To

recover

them

so quickly,

we must

assume

that

resp

would have stayed in the Laguardia area, 9 thus severely restricting his movement.
Jersey,

In view of the fact

that resp was from New

and had already telephoned for a limousine,

presumably have been a serious imposition.

this would

We would also have to

assume that the agents would have returned the bags promptly once
resp' s

innocence

was

established,

such an assumption in the record.

and

there

is no support

for

It is noteworthy, for example,

that the agents did not return the larger suitcase, as to which
they did not have probable cause even after exposing it to the
sniffer dog.

All they did at the time of the arrest was give

resp a telephone number to call to see about recovering his bags,

f

?,

with no suggestion as to when such a call would be appropriate or
where resp would have to go or what he would have to do to regain

)

possess ion of

his

property.

Under

these

circumstances,

it

is

extraordinarily generous to the Government to speak of this case
as involving merely a two hour seizure.
If the Court is generous enough to treat this as a two
hour seizure,

there can still be little doubt that it goes far

beyond anything the Court has permitted under Terry.

(The Court

9 If resp had gone with the agents to Kennedy, of course, he
would have been able to recover the bags sooner.
If the resp is
required to go with the agents to protect his right to recover
his luggage, however, he has effectively been seized himself.
Such a seizure is plainly impermissible. See note 4, supra.

has rejected less intrusive seizures in Royer and Dunaway.)

Fur-

thermore, even if the Court were to ignore past precedents, this
seizure should still be considered unreasonable.
fication

for

dispensing with

The only justi-

the probable cause requirement is

the assumption that the seizure at issue is minimally intrusive.
The police intrusion here, however,

did far more than offend a

person intent on asserting his Fourth Amendment rights.

An inno-

cent traveller whose bags were detained without probable cause
under these circumstances would be understandably furious. 10
The SG claims to justify the seizure here on the basis
of the Government's interest in controlling the drug traffic. 11
That interest is, of course, compelling, and it is sufficient to
justify a minimal intrusion on the basis of reasonable suspicion
rather than probable cause.

1

But in the absence of probable cause

10 The Government has argued that the Fourth Amendment standard
should be based on what a reasonable person innocent of any
wrongdoing would find objectionable.
This Court has frequently
rejected that standard.
Numerous decisions recognize the right
of an individual to protect his Fourth Amendment rights far more
vigorously than a typical
innocent bystander.
See, e.g.,
Kolender v. Lawson, No. 81-1320. But even if the Court accepted
this "general reasonableness" test, the conduct here would not
satisfy it.
Almost anyone would be furious if the pol ice took
his luggage from him on a Friday afternoon and merely gave him a
telephone number that he or his attorney could call to arrange to
pick up the luggage himself at some unspecified time. Although
that innocent person could avoid this inconvenience by consenting
to a search, it is no answer to resp's argument to say that he
could have waived his clear Fourth Amendment rights in order to
avoid the violation of other Fourth Amendment rights.
11The real governmental interest that the SG seeks to protect
here is the DEA' s decision not to have a "sniffer dog" at
LaGuardia Airport. And the only justification for that decision
is the assertion that it would be uneconomical to keep a dog at
LaGuardia.

it is only sufficient to justify a minimally intrusive seizure of
a suspect's luggage.

A generalized interest in controlling the

drug traffic (awful as that traffic is) does not justify an abandonment of all Fourth Amendment principles.

In particular,

it

does not justify a two hour seizure of luggage on less than probable cause--any more than it justified the less intrusive seizure
in Florida v. Royer, No. 80-2146.

III.
On
recognize

a

the
new

issue

Conclusion

of general

exception

to

the

importance,

the Court

Fourth Amendment's

should

probable

cause requirement (along the lines of Terry) to permit a minimally intrusive seizure of a suspect's luggage when the police have
a reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains contraband.

On

the fact-specific issue presented in this case, the Court should
hold that the seizure at issue here went far beyond anything that
was reasonably justifiable.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1617

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
RAYMONDJ. PLACE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily
detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the
luggage contains narcotics. Given the strength of the public
interest in detecting narcotics trafficking and the minimal intrusion that a properly limited detention would entail, we
conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such
a. detention. On the facts of this case, however, we hold that
the police conduct exceeded the bounds of a permissible investigative detention of the luggage.
I

Respondent Raymond J. Place's nervous behavior aroused
the suspicions of law enforcement officers as he waited in line
at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to
New York's LaGuardia Airport. As Place proceeded to the
gate for his flight, the agents approached him and requested
his airline ticket and some identification. Place complied
with the request and consented to a search of the two suitcases he had checked. Because his flight was about to depart, however, the agents decided not to search the luggage.
Prompted by Place's parting remark that he had recog-

~~~~a1-t~~,
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nized that they were police, the agents inspected the address
tags on the checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the
two street addresses. Further investigation revealed that
neither address existed and that the telephone number Place
had given the airline belonged to a third address on the same
street. On the basis of their encounter with Place and this
information, the Miami agents called Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) authorities in New York to relay their information about Place.
Two DEA agents waited for Place at the arrival gate at
LaGuardia Airport in New York. There again, his behavior
aroused the suspicion of the agents. After he had claimed
his two bags and called a limousine, the agents decided to approach him. They identified themselves as federal narcotics
agents, to which Place responded that he knew they were
"cops" and had spotted them as soon as he had deplaned.
One of the agents informed Place that, based on their own observations and information obtained from the Miami authorities, they believed that he might be carrying narcotics.
After identifying the bags as belonging to him, Place stated
that a number of police at the Miami Airport had surrounded
him and searched his baggage. The agents responded that
their information was to the contrary. The agents requested
and received identification from Place-a New Jersey driver's license, on which the agents later ran a computer check
that disclosed no offenses, and his airline ticket receipt.
When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, one
of the agents told him that they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant and
that Place was free to accompany them. Place declined, but
obtained from one of the agents telephone numbers at which
the agents could be reached.
The agents then took the bags to Kennedy Airport, where
they subjected the bags to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics
detection dog. The dog reacted positively to the smaller of
the two bags but ambiguously to the larger bag. Approxi-
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mately 90 minutes had elapsed since the seizure of respondent's luggage. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon,
the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning, when
they secured a search warrant from a magistrate for the
smaller bag. Upon opening that bag, the agents discovered
1, 125 grams of cocaine.
Place was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). In the District Court, Place moved to suppress the contents of the luggage seized from him at LaGuardia Airport, claiming that the
warrantless seizure of the luggage violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 1 The District Court denied the motion.
Applying the standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), to
the detention of personal property, it concluded that detention of the bags could be justified if based on reasonable suspicion to believe that the bags contained narcotics. Finding
reasonable suspicion, the District Court held that Place's
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by seizure of
the bags by the DEA agents. 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1228
1
In support of his motion, respondent also contended that the detention
of his person at both the Miami and LaGuardia airports was not based on
reasonable suspicion and that the "sniff test" of his luggage violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. 498 F . Supp. 1217, 1221, 1228 (EDNY 1980).
The District Court concluded that the agents had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Place was engaged in criminal activity when he was detained
at the two airports and that the stops were therefore lawful. !d., at 1225,
1226. On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach this issue, assuming
the existence of reasonable suspicion. Respondent Place cross-petitioned
in this Court on the issue of reasonable suspicion, and we denied certiorari.
457 U. S. - - (1982). We therefore have no occasion to address the issue
here.
We also note that respondent's challenge in the District Court to the
"sniff test" was a challenge only to the manner in which the particular test
was administered. 498 F. Supp., at 1226. Respondent did not raise, and
we do not address, the question whether a sniff test by a trained narcotics
detection dog constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
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(EDNY 1980). Place pleaded guilty to the possession
charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress.
On appeal of the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 660 F. 2d 44 (1981).
The majority assumed both that Terry principles could be applied to justify a warrantless seizure of baggage on less than
probable cause and that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop of Place. The majority concluded,
however, that the prolonged seizure of Place's baggage exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative
stop and consequently amounted to a seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. - - (1982), and now
affirm.
II

The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." (Emphasis
added.) Although in the context of personal property, and
particularly containers, the Fourth Amendment challenge is
typically to the subsequent search of the container rather
than to its initial seizure by the authorities, our cases reveal
some general principles regarding seizures. In the ordinary
case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial
warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized. 2 See, e. g., Marron v. United
States, 275 U. S. 192, 196 (1927). Where law enforcement
authorities have probable cause to believe that a container
2
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
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holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured.
a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to
examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances
demand it. See, e. g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753,
761 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). 3
In this case, the Government asks us to recognize the
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of warrantless
seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on
the basis of less than probable cause, for the p~~ose ?f pursuing a limited course of investigation, short of~, that
would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities' suspicion.
Specifically, we are asked to extend the principles of Terry v.
Ohio, supra, to permit such seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that
the luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime. In
our view, such an extension is appropriate. 4
In Terry the Court first recognized "the narrow authority
of police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on
In Sanders, the Court explained:
"The police acted properly-indeed commendably-in apprehending respondent and his luggage. They had ample probable cause to believe that
respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana. . . . Having probable
cause to believe that contraband was being driven away in the taxi, the
police were justified in stopping the vehicle ... and seizing the suitcase
they suspected contained contraband." 442 U. S., at 761.
The Court went on to hold that the police violated the Fourth Amendment
in immediately searching the luggage rather than first obtaining a warrant
authorizing the search. I d., at 766. That holding was not affected by our
recent decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, - - (1982).
'We note "that an officer's authority to possess a package is distinct
from his authority to examine its contents." Walter v. United States, 447
U. S. 649, 654 (1980) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (footnote omitted). Respondent Place has not contended that the exposure of his luggage to the
trained narcotics detection dog constitutes an unlawful search, and that
question is not before us. See n. 1, supra.
8

81-1617-0PINION
6

UNITED STATES v. PLACE

less than probable cause." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S.
692, 698 (1981). In approving the limited search for weapons, or "frisk," of an individual the police reasonably believed
to be armed and dangerous, the Court implicitly acknowledged the authority of the police to make a forcible stop of a
person when the officer has reaonable, articulable suspicion
that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity. 392 U. S., at 22. 5 That implicit proposition was embraced openly in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S.
143, 146 (1972), where the Court relied on Terry to hold that
the police officer lawfully made a forcible stop of the suspect
to investigate an informant's tip that the suspect was carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon. See also Michigan v.
Summers, supra (limited detention of occupants while authorities search premises pursuant to valid search warrant);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (stop near border of vehicle suspected of transporting illegal aliens); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (order
to get out oflawfully stopped car); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (brief investigative stop near border for questioning about citizenship and immigration
status).
The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved. We
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
• In his concurring opinion in Terry, Justice Harlan made this logical underpinning of the Court's Fourth Amendment holding clear:
"In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer
during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. . . . I
would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends
upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected
crime." 392 U. S., at 32-33 (Harlan, J ., concurring).
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individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. Only when the ture and extent of the detention
are minimally intrusive of he individual's Fourth Amendment interests can the opposing law enforcement interests
support a seizure based on less than probable cause.
We examine first the governmental interest offered as a
justification for a brief seizure of luggage from the suspect's
custody for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investigation. The Government contends that, where the authorities possess specific and articulable facts warranting a
reasonable belief that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics,
the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to
pursue further investigation is substantial. We agree. As
observed in United States v. Mendenhall, "[t]he public has a
compelling inter
in detecting those who would traffic in
deadly d
or ers nal profit." 446 U. S. 544, 561 (1980)
(opinion f Po EL , J.).
Respon ent ggests that, absent some special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment interests in the absence of
probable cause. Our prior cases, however, have rejected the
suggestion that "the presence of some governmental interest
independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crimes
and apprehending suspects" is necessary to justify an intrusion based only on reasonable suspicion, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S., at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 6 Indeed,
6
In Michigan, we concluded that "the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found,"
in "minimizing the risk of harm" both to the officers and the occupants, and
in "the orderly completion of the search" justified a limited detention of the
occupants of the premises during execution of a valid search warrant for
the premises. 452 U. S., at 702-703.
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in Terry itself, we acknowledged that the initial seizure of the
person, as opposed to the subsequent frisk, was justified by
the general interest in "effective crime prevention and detection." 392 U. S., at 22. 7
Even if it were incumbent upon the Government to "demonstrate an important purpose beyond the normal goals of
criminal investigation, or . . . an extraordinary obstacle to
such investigation," Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. at
708 (Stewart, J., dissenting), we think that burden would be
met here.
"Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs . . . may be easily
concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may be u
e · any other area of law
enforcement." U ed States v.
denhall, 446 U. S.,
at 561-562 (opi . n of POWELL, J.).
Particularly in the c text of airport su veillance, police must
make rapid, on-the-s ot responses t suspected criminal behavior if they are to pr nt the
of narcotics into distribution channels.
Against this strong public interest, we must weigh the
general nature and extent of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights when the police briefly seize his
7

"[l]t is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 22.
8
"The special need for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers is
hardly debatable. Surely the problem is as serious, and as intractable, as
the problem of illegal immigration, discussed in United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S., at 878--879, and in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U. S., at 552." Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. - - , - - (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
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luggage for limited investigative purposes. On this point,
respondent Place urges that the rationale for a Terry stop of
the person is wholly inapplicable to investigative detentions
of personalty. Specifically, the Terry exception to the probable-cause requirement is premised on the notion that a
Terry-type stop of the person is substantially less intrusiv~of
a person's liberty interests than a formal arrest. In the
property context, however, Place urges, there are no degrees of intrusion. Once the owner's property is seized, the
dispossession is absolute.
We disagree. The intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one's personal effects can vary both in
its nature and extent. The seizure may be made after the
owner has relinquished control of the property to a third
party or, as here, from the immediate custody and control of
the owner. 9 Moreover, the police may confine their investigation to an on-the-spot inquiry-for example, immediate exposure of the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog 10One need only compare the facts of this case with those in United .
States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). There the defendant had
voluntarily relinquished two packages of coins to the postal authorities.
Several facts aroused the suspicion of the postal officials, who detained the
packages, without searching them, for about 29 hours while certain lines of
inquiry were pursued. The information obtained during this time was sufficient to give the authorities probable cause to believe that the packages
contained counterfeit coins. After obtaining a warrant, the authorities
opened the packages, found counterfeit coins therein, resealed the packages and sent them on their way. Expressly limiting its holding to the
facts of the case, the Court concluded that the 29-hour detention of the
packages on reasonable suspicion that they contained contraband did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. I d., at 253.
As one commentator has noted, "Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the
Court because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded
upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the packages themselves." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6, p. 60 (1982 Supp.).
1
°Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. - - , - - (1983) (plurality opinion)
("We agree with the State that [the officers had] adequate grounds for sus9

1
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or transport the property to another location. Given the fact
that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some
brief de e tions of ersonal effects rna be so mi · ly intrusive of ourth Amendment interests that strong counterval ing governmental interests will justify a seizure based
only on specific articulable facts that the property contains
contraband or evidence of a crime.
In sum, we conclude that when an officer's observations
lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the m-inciples of.Jerry and its
progeny would permit the officer t~ detain the luggage
briefly to investigate the circumstances tnat aroused his susp~ provided that the investigative detention is properly
limited in scope.
III
There is no doubt that the agents made a "seizure" of
Place's luggage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
when, following his refusal to consent to a search, the agent
told Place that he was going to take the luggage to a federal
judge to secure issuance of a warrant. As we observed in
Terry, "[t]he manner in which the seizure ... [was] conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether
[it was] warranted at all." 392 U. S., at 28. We therefore
examine whether the agents' conduct in this case was such as
to place the seizure within the general rule requiring probable cause for a seizure or within Terry's exception to that
rule.
The precise type of detention we confront here is seizure of
personal luggage from the immediate possession of the suspect for the purpose of arranging exposure to a narcotics detection dog. Particularly in the case of detention of luggage
pecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his
luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative detentio . ') (emphasis
added).

(
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within the traveler's immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in his
luggage as well as his libert interest in proceedin with his
itinerary.
uc a seizure e ectlve y restrains the person,
srnce he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel
plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its
return. 11 Therefore, we must reject the Government's suggestion that the point at which probable cause for seizure of
luggage from the person's presence becomes necessary is
more distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person
himself. The premise of the Government's argument is that
seizures of property are generally less intrusive than seizures
of the person. While true in some circumstances, that
premise is faulty on the facts we address in this case. When
the police seize luggage from the sus ect's cus ody, we think
the lnm a wns app 1ca e to investigative detentions of the
person should deffiiethe permissible scope of an investigative
de.!_entionof the persorrs lu,S"gage on less than probable cause.
Unaer th1s standard, it is clear that the police conduct here
exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative
stop.
The length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone
precludesthe- concTusiOfi that the seizure was reasonable in
the" absence of probable cause. Although we have recognized the reasonableness of seizures longer than the momentary ones involved in Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce,
see Michigan v. Summers, supra, the brevity of the invasion
of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so mini"At least when the authorities do not make it absolutely clear how they
plan to reunite the suspect and his possessions at some future time and
place, seizure of the object is tantamount to seizure of the person. This is
because that person must either remain on the scene or else seemingly surrender his effects permanently to the police." 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.6, p. 61 (1982 Supp.).
11
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mally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.
Further, although we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a Qermissible Terry stop, 12 we have never approved
a seizure of aperson for the prOlonged 90-mmute period involved fiere and"refUse to do so now. See Dunaway v. New
f'ork, 442 U. "S. 200 (19'79). We note that the New York
agents knew the time of Place's scheduled arrival at
LaGuardia, had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at that location, and thereby could have minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth Amendment
interests. 13
Although the 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage
is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation
was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to which they were transporting
his luggage, of tlie length of time he might be dispossessed,
and of what arrangements would be made for return of the
luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In
short, we hold that the detention of respondent's lug age in
this case went beyon
on y possessed by po-

-

Cf. ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(1) (1975)
(recommending a maximum of 20 minutes for a Terry stop). We understand the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clear
rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a
rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermme the equally Important
need Co allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any
particular situation. Whether the length of the detention impermissibly
intrudes on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests must take into
account whether the police diligently pursue a method of investigation that
will quickly confirm or dispel their suspicion. See 3 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.2, p. 40 (1978).
13
Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. - - , - - (1983) ("If [trained narcotics detection dogs had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been
momentarily detained while this investigative procedure was carried
~ '). This course of conduct also would have avoided the further sub/
~~~tial intrusion on respondent's possessory interests caused by the removal of his luggage to another location.
12
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lice to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain
narcotics.
IV
We conclude that, under all of the circumstances of this
case, the seizure of respondent's luggage was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence
obtained from the subsequent search of his luggage was inadmissible, and Place's conviction must be reversed. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is afRmled.

It i.s so ordmed. --'---
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-1617 - United States v. Place
Dear Sandra:
I am glad to join your second draft circulated
April 14.
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Justice O'Connor
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Dear Sandra,
Please join me.

sincerelv

Justice O'Connor
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Re:

No. 81-1617 - United States v. Place

Dear Sandra:
On April
Changes made
attract Bill
on April 29)

28, I joined your second draft circulated April 14.
in your third draft, which I assume were made to
Rehnquist's vote (judging by his immediate joinder
are somewhat disturbing to me.

I feel, for example, that the first sentence of the first
full paragraph on page 7 is somewhat out of context from the
Terry material that immediately preceded your Terry quote.
In
addition, as I read the revision of· page 11, you have shifted
the departure test to a subjective one. Does this mean that if
the Government can prove that Place did not determine that it
was necessary for him to remain with the luggage or otherwise
disrupt his travel, there is no Fourth Amendment violation?
Place, of course, in this case left the airport without his
luggage.
Further, the addition of the sentence on page 12
beginning with "Moreover" focuses upon diligent police procedures.
I doubt if the Court has ever held this.
In Dunaway,
there was no bow whatsoever in the direction of diligence.
If the third draft remains as it is, I withdraw my joinder
and you may record me as concurring only in the result.

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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No. 81-1617 United States v. Place

Dear Harry,
I regret that the changes made in my third draft
were unacceptable to you.
I had thought they were not
inconsistent with the second draft.
I am willing to make a
few more modifications if they will answer your concerns.
With respect to page 7, it is helpful, I think, to
refer to the language of the Fourth Amendment in connection
with describing the balancing standard for justifiying an
exception to the probable cause requirement.
I would be
willing to delete the first sentence of the first full
paragraph, and add the following phrase to the end of the
next sentence, " ... within the meaning of 'the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures.'"
With regard to page 11, it was not my intention to
shift to a subjective test. Perhaps your concern can be met
by a return to the following language in the last sentence
on page 11:
"Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively
restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible
disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his
luggage or to arrange for its return • .J.j"
The addition of the sentence on page 12 beginning
with "Moreover" also does not represent a new thought that
appeared for the first time in the third draft. That
thought previously appeared in footnote 10 of the second
draft to explain why adoption of a rigid time limitation for

2.

permissible Terry stops would not be appropriate.
In my
view, whether the police diligently pursue their
investigation can affect, in either direction, the
determination whether the detention was impermissibly long-i. e., even a relatively short detention might impermissibly
intrude upon an individual's Fourth Amendment interests if
the police do not make an effort to confirm or dispel their
suspicion during that time.
In this case, as the opinion
points out, the police did not make efforts reasonably at
their disposal to conduct the investigation expeditiously
and thereby minimize the intrusion on Place's Fourth
Amendment interests. This factor exacerbates the critical
fact that the luggage was held for the prolonged 90-minute
period.
Although only a plurality opinion, the opinion in
Florida v. Royer does support the notion that the diligence
with which the police pursue their investigation is relevant
to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. There, the opinion notes:
"an investigative detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop." Slip op. at 9.
If my explanation and proposed adjustments will
allay your concerns, I will gladly make the changes.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
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concurring.
Dealing first with the legality of the initial seizure of
Place's luggage, the Court affirms the right of the government to seize the luggage without a warrant and on less than
probable cause, "for the purpose of pursuing a limited course
of investigation." Ante, at 5. This conclusion would plainly
be foreclosed if the investigative procedure to be carried out
was itself illegal or would violate the Fourth Amendment. 1
I take it, therefore, that the Court is of the view that the
purpose of the seizure-to carry out a canine sniff-was consistent wit the Fourth Amendment, eith
cause theuse
of
g ou d ~ot cons 1 u e a sear
erwise impliJUSTICE WHITE,

In reviewing the reasonableness of investigative detentions, the Court
has always looked at the purpose to be served by the detention. Whether
a seizure is lawful when initiated depends both on the existence of reasonable suspicion and on whether the course of investigation to be pursued
during the detention is itself lawful. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20
(1963); United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 421 (1981); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-882 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407
U. S. 143, 146 (1972). In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981), the
Court held that reasonable suspicion was sufficient to support a detention
for the purpose of maintaining the status quo during a search of the person's residence pursuant to a valid search warrant. There is little doubt
that the detention in Summers would not have been considered "reasonable" if its purpose was to maintain the status quo during an illegal search.
1
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cate the Fourth Amendment or because, even if the sniff is a
search, it is a search that may be carried out on reasonable
suspicion and without probable cause or a warrant.
To reach its conclusion that the initial seizure of the luggage was justifiable, the Court must rest on one of these alternative grounds. Since it purports to reserve the question
of whether the canine sniff is a sears , ante, a n. , 1 must
be l'foldmg; artnoiign1t aoes not expressly say so, that even if
a ~h, reasonable sus:e_icion is sufficie!!!- to justify ~
agree with that vieW('aTthough the l:ourt would nave been
better advised to justify the canine investigation on the
grounds that the procedure does not itself require reasonable
{ suspicion or probable cause or otherwise implicate the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment "protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations
of privacy." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7
(1977). There is a privacy interest in the contents of suitcases that is protected by the Fourth Amendment and luggage may not be opened and its contents revealed without
probable cause and normally without a warrant. But a "canine sniff'' does not ex ose the contents of a suitcase. --u-Tnvolves only the outside surface of the luggage, w 1ch is certainly "knowingly expose[d] to the public," Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967), and the surrounding air
which is something in which no person has either a possessory or privacy interest. Without intruding on any legiti'The possibility that drug-detecting dogs could have been used as a
means of investigating a suspected drug-courier was also discussed with
approval in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. - , - (1983) (plurality opinion). Unlike the present case, the use of these specialized canines was not
involved in that case and there was no opportunity to decide whether their
use constitutes a search. That issue is presented in this case and the Court
should not leave a cloud of doubt over the propriety of this investigative
technique.

81-1617-0PINION
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3

mate expectation of privacy in the contents of the luggage, a
"sniff test" provides the authorities with reliable evidence indicating that among the contents of the suitcase there is contraband. The Fourth Amendment does not protect a subjective expectation that one may have that the police will be
unable, without actually seeing the contents, to garner sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
Nor does it protect people against the use of particular devices or investigative methods unless there is an intrusion on
a legitimate privacy interest. The suggestion that law enforcement authorities may only use their own senses, or a device that enhances their own senses, rather than a "device"
that replaces their senses is without merit. 3 There is little
doubt that if the officer could, by sniffing the outer surface of
a suitcase, smell an odor that he knew from experience was
that of contraband he would have probable cause, and no one
would suggest that the officer's sniff constituted a "search" of
the suitcase. 4 Although drug-couriers may bemoan the fact
that "man's best friend" has become the narcotics-carrier's
worst enemy, if a human "sniff'' does not invade any protected privacy interest, then a dog "sniff'' does not either.
Given that the particular course of investigation that the
agents intended to pursue did not itself violate the Fourth
Amendment and that the agents had reasonable suspicion to
believe the suitcases contained contraband, the seizure in this
case was "justified at its inception." Terry v. Ohio, 392
~

3

The only Court of Appeals that has held a "sniff' of luggage to be a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment relied on such a
distinction. See United States v. Beale, 674 F. 2d. 1327, 1333 (CA9 1982),
cert. pending, No. 82-674.
'Although the Court of Appeals in United States v. Beale, supra, found
that a "dog sniff' of luggage was a "search," it conceded that "[h]ad [the
detective], .utilizing only his own natural senses, been able to detect the
odor of controlled substances emanating from [defendant's] suitcase, this
would not have been a Fourth Amendment intrusion. Id., at 1332.

81-1617-0PINION
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U. S. 1, 20 (1963). The only remaining question is "whether
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Ibid. It is
the Government's burden to show that the particular detention at issue was sufficienty limited in scope and duration.
Florida v. Rou.er, 460 U. S. - , - (1983) (plurality opinion). Here, the Government argues that the scope and duration of the detention meet constitutional requirements because "the agents did not know that they would need a dog to
search respondent's luggage," Brief for Petitioner 31, and
that "the paucity of trained drug detecting dogs makes it impossible as a practical matter to have a dog waiting whenever
a suspected drug courier is arriving at an airport." Ibid.
These asserted justifications do not bespeak necessity or
expediency.
Although I am sympathetic to the myriad problems with
which law enforcement authorities must cope in executing
their duties, wherever the solution to the Government's
problems may lie, it is not in sacrificing interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I agree with the
Court that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
affirmed.
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

United States v. Place, No. 81-1617

I

agree with JUSTICE WHITE's

theory

Court to consider the legality of a dog sniff.

that permits
!~ so

the

agree that

it would be a good idea to resolve the issue now, without having
another argued case.

JUSTICE WHITE does not make it clear in his concurring
opinion what he thinks is the appropriate rationale for upholding
dog sniffs.

I think the Court should make clear that such sniffs

--

are not "searches" within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.

~sniffs do not reveal the contents of the luggage.

Dog

The dogs are

trained to reveal only whether a specific type of contraband is
present.

(This

Jacobsen, No.
cotics).
further

rationale

82-1167

will also apply

to United States v.

(validity of chemical field test for nar-

Perhaps the Court could vacate and remand Jacobsen for
consideration

oral argument slot.)

in

light of Place,

thus

saving an extra

This is very different from an X-ray, for

example, which reveals information about all of the contents of a
suitcase--innocent items and contraband alike.

It would not be a good idea to hold that dog sniffs are
searches, but nevertheless permissible on reasonable suspicion.
First,

this would be an unnecessary extension of the Terry ra-

tionale.

Terry permits a weapons frisk

in view of the strong

interest in protecting the safety of the officer.

But Terry has

not been used to justify other searches, only seizures.

Second,

this rationale would be an undue limitation on police practice,
for

it would impose a reasonable suspicion requirement before a

dog sniff can take place.

Such a requirement is, of course, no

problem in a situation such as this, where the police must seize
the luggage before exposing it to a sniffer dog.

But a reason-

able suspicion requirement could prohibit the police from exposing luggage to sniffer dogs while it is in the airlines' custody.
I do not think it would be wise to foreclose such procedures at
this point.

I

have drafted

consideration.

a

letter

to JUSTICE O'CONNOR for

your

You may wish to add a line saying that you agree

with JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestions.

All three of his suggestions

are fairly technical, however, so I do not think it is necessary
for you to express your views.

1._.;-

SOC-MICHAL-POW

Draft Letter to JUSTICE O'CONNOR

May 5, 1983

Re:

United States v. Place, No. 81-1617

Dear Sandra:

I

agree with Byron's theory that permits the Court to

consider the legality of a dog sniff in this case.
lice

seized

the

luggage,

expose it to a sniffer dog.
before us,
us.

And

Once the po-

their only legitimate purpose was

to

Since the legality of the seizure is

the legality of the officers' purpose is also before
I

agree

that

it would

be a good

idea to resolve the

issue now, without having another argued case.

In resolving the issue, I would prefer to say that a dog
sniff of a piece of luggage is not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.
the luggage.

Dog sniffs do not reveal the contents of

The dogs are trained to reveal only whether a spe-

cific type of contraband is present.

This is very different from

an X-ray, for example, which reveals information about all of the
contents--innocent items and contraband alike.

Sincerely,

j

rr----...

.:§nvrtw <!fand cf fqt ~niblt ~fait$'
~!Utftington, ~. <!f. 2Ilc?J.!.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

May 5, 1983

No. 81-1617

United States v. Place

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Byron has circulated a persuasive
concurring opinion which would address and resolve
the question of whether the dog sniff is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

I

My draft had reserved the question
because it had not been argued or addressed below.
I am willing to address the question and to adopt
Byron's reasoning if there are sufficient votes in
the Conference.
Sincerely,

;l!'U.pnnu 'lf.&ml'l llt

urt

._ufring~ J.

~utlltll

,\l9uu.tll

<If. 20~~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 5, 1983
Re:

No. 81-1617

United States v. Place

Dear Sandra:
I approve of your proposal to treat the "dog sniff"
issue as indicated in your memorandum of May 5th.
Sincerely,

~
Justice O'Connor
cc:

...

The Conference

~upume

<!fo-urt o-f iqf ~nittb

~a-9'1fington, ~.

<!f.

~taft.«

20gi.l!~

C H A M BE RS OF'

JU S TICE JOHN PAUL STE VENS

May 5, 1983

Re:

81-1617 - United States v. Place

Dear Sandra:
Your exchange of corr e spondence with Harry prompted me
to reread your opinion in this case.
I am not troubled by
the changes on pages 7 and 11 but I do share Harry's concern
about the added emphasis on diligence on page 12. Perhaps
you could take the word "must" out of the "Moreover"
sentence and make it read something like this:
"Moreover, in assessing the effect of the length
of the detention, we take into account the
character of the diligence with which the police
pursued their investigation."
My rereading also caused me to recognize three
minor points that I would like to suggest for your
consideration. These are all purely suggestions and if
you find none of them persuasive that is perfectly
satisfactory with me.
First, in the last line on page 5 you refer to the
Government asking us "to extend" the principles of
Terry and again in the fourth line on page 6 to such an
"extension." I wonder if you might not want to
consider substituting the word "construe" on page 5 and
the words "a construction" on page 6.
I actually do
not believe you are departing from the principle that
is already implicit in Terry and other decided cases
and this slight change in wording makes us look a
little more like judges and a little less like
lawmakers.
In footnote 6 on page 8 you indicate that "we have
observed" whereas you are really quoting a separate

.,

.

- 2 -

opinion by JUSTICE POWELL. Should you not change it to
"JUSTICE POWELL has observed"?
On page 9, it has occurred to me that there is an
additional response to the argument that even a
temporary dispossession of property is absolute that
you may wish to make.
It is the obvious but often
overlooked point that the brief dispossession of a
locked suitcase involves no invasion of the privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
(My
concern about the differences between the privacy
interest and the possessory interest is what took me so
long in figuring out what to say in Texas v. Brown.)
I
wonder if you might want to insert something like this
immediately after the words "We disagree" at the outset
of the second paragraph.
"It is perfectly clear that a temporary
dispossession of a locked suitcase involves no
examination of its contents and therefore no
invasion of the owner's interest in privacy. See
Texas v. Brown, STEVENS, J., concurring, slip op.,
at p. 2."
It may be that you are reluctant to mention the
interest in privacy because the very reason for the seizure
of the suitcase is to allow the trained dog to take a sniff
which itself might be regarded as an intrusion on privacy.
Implicitly, however, we must be deciding that such a sniff
is perfectly okay or there would be no point .in allowing the
temporary seizure for the purpose of locating the dog.
Respectfully,

)~
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

United States v. Place, No. 81-1617

I

have

read

your

draft

letter

this case, and have a modification to

to JUSTICE O'CONNOR in

/'...f'l

suggest.~~

second paragraph, I recommend adding a sentence to the end of the
first paragraph as follows:

v~~~
canin7t~ ~ ~

~ould j~in

I
an opinion saying that a
su1tcase 1s not a search.

~~ ~ ~
d-~-

Deleting the second paragraph has two effects.

First, you would

not be tied to all of JUSTICE WHITE's reasoning as to why a canine sniff of a suitcase is not a search.
tie

a

canine

sniff

of

a

sui tease

to

Second, you would not

the

reasonable

suspicion

standard.
Although

I

agree

with

JUSTICE WHI'rE' s

reasoning

that

permits the Court to reach the canine sniff issue, I think there
are serious conceptual problems with his resolution of the issue.
He argues, for example, that a person has no privacy interest in
the air around his luggage.

This argument, however, would permit

a noncanine sniff by a sensitive device that is capable of identifying

all

the contents of

a

suitcase

by smell.

Despite the

fact that there are several good points in JUSTICE WHITE's draft,
I don't think you should give carte blanche to his reasoning.
Since

I

do not

think a canine sniff

is a search

(and

since I think there are five votes to so hold), I do not think it

is necessary to say what level of suspicion is necessary to justify such an event if it were a search.

In view of your opinion

in Texas v. Brown, it also seems inappropriate to rush into a new
exception to the warrant Clause so quickly.
plained in my original memo,

Finally,

as I ex-

a reasonable suspicion requirement

could well be an unnecessary burden on police practice in these
"non-search" cases.
I can understand why you do not want to include such a
detailed

discussion

in your

letter

to

JUSTICE 0 'CONNOR.

Your

current draft, with the change I have proposed, will allow her to
address the issue.

It will also allow you to consider what she

has written without the constraint of previous statements.

.
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United

~tates

v. Place

Dear Sannra:
I aqree that a dog sniff is not a search within the
meaninq of the Fourth Amennment, ann I think we should sav
so.

AJso, the suqgestions in John's letter of the 5th seem
reasonable.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lj

Copies to the ConferencP
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

May 11, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1617, U.S. v. Place

Dear Byron:
If there are four others I could go the whole
route with your "dog view" in this case and settle
one issue.

This is not an area where argument would

add anything for me.
Regards,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference

~nvrtmt

QI•ttttf at tltt ~tb ~tatt.tr

~Jrhtghtn. ~. <!J. 20b}J!.~
CHAM B ER S OF

.J USTIC E BYRON R . WHITE

May 12, 1983

Re:

81-1617 -

United States v. Place

Dear Sandra,
Please

join

me.

I

shall

file

my

separate opinion in the unfiled opinion file.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
cpm

~upreme

<!Jtrurl trf t4e ~nittb ~taftg

~l:Ullyittgftm.. ~.
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C H A M BERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

May 13, 1983
Re:

No. 81-1617

United States v. Place

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your most recent circulation.
Sincerely,

vJvV
Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

17, 1983

81-1617 United States v. Place

Dear Sandra:
~his

will reaffirm my join of pour opinion.
Sincerely,

,,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

'
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

May 18, 1983
~

.. j
'I

I

Re:

81-1617 - United States v. Place

Dear Sandra:
I join.

Re gards,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLA C KMUN

June 1

1983

Re: No. 81-1617 - United States v. Place
Dear Sandra:
Because of the changes effected in your drafts subsequent
to the second, I now formally withdraw my joinder of April 28.
This concurrence in the judgment expresses my views.
Sincerely,

~

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

.§u:vuutt <qo-ud Df tqt 'J!tnittb .§tafts
~aslyittghm. ~-
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21lp'l-~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 1, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1617-United States

v~

Place

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Blackrnun
CC:

The Conference

.®upumt QJcurt .of litl' 'J.iittitl'~ .;§taus
'lnasJrittgtcn. :!B. ~· 2llbl'l-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 15, 1983

Re:

No. 81-1617-United States v. Place

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

81-1617

u.s.

v. Place (Mike)

soc for Court
1st draft 4/5/83
2nd draft 4/14/83
3rd draft 4/30/83
4th draft 5/11/83
5th draft 6/16/83
Joined by CJ, BRW, TM, LFP, WHR, JPS
HAB concurring opinion
1st draft 6/1/83
Joined by TM
WJB concurring in the result
1st draft 6/15/83
Joined by TM

